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Case Studies

Bolivia-Brazil Gas Pipeline
Chad-Cameroon Oil Pipeline
Basic Resources International Ltd. Oi
Kumtor Gold Mine
Lihir Gold
Omai Gold Mine



Bolivia-Brazil Pipeline
South America

Project Description
The Bolivia-Brazil natural gas pipeline is the largest private sector investment in Latin America. This 3000 kilometer pipeline stretches from Santa Cruz, Bolivia to Porto Alegre, Brazil. It crosses several important ecosystems: the Gran Chaco, a recently designated protected area of primary dry tropical forest in Bolivia; the Pantanal, the world's largest wetland; and the Mata Atlantica Rainforest of Southeastern Brazil.


World Bank Involvement
In 1997 the World Bank approved a $310 million loan for this $2 billion project. The loan supports Petrobras, a Brazilian state-owned energy company that is the principal investor and operator of the pipeline. The owner of the pipeline in Brazil is TGB, whose investors include Petrobras, Transredes, Enron, Shell and BTB. Gas Transboliviano, a consortium comprising Transredes, Enron, Shell and Petrobras, owns the Bolvian portion of the pipeline. In FY 1999, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), the political risk insurance arm of the World Bank, provided a $14.6 million risk insurance guarantee to Enron.


Environmental and Social Concerns
The project has failed to address the most important negative social and environmental impacts associated with the pipeline: the significant impacts from new oil and gas exploration and distribution activities on indigenous lands and in Bolivia's fragile Amazon Basin area, made possible by the construction of this pipeline.

The explosion of oil and gas development pose threats to the livelihoods of indigenous peoples, local populations and the fragile ecosystems which sustain them in this region. With the passage of the World Bank and IDB financed 1996 hydrocarbon law and privatization of Bolivia's state owned oil and gas company, YPFB, and the construction of the Bolivia-Brazil pipeline in 1998, oil and gas development in the region has intensified dramatically. A second connected pipeline to Cuiaba, Brazil, under construction by Enron-Shell with backing from Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), will further intensify demand for natural gas and is causing significant environmental damage along the planned route, which includes primary tropical forest and the Pantanal wetlands. In the past two years, Bolivia has granted dozens of new oil and gas concessions, mostly on indigenous lands and in protected areas. Estimates indicate that the sector will triple its current production over the next ten years, leading to the associated negative impacts of more pipelines, roads, waterways, colonization and industrial agricultural development (soy). In response to sustained pressure from Bolivian and US NGOs to address the upstream impacts from the Bolivia-Brazil pipeline, in Spring 1999, the World Bank initiated a small environmental management capacity building pilot project, which is still under preparation. This loan, however, is inadequate to address the scope and intensity of the problems. In addition, the pipeline engendered many direct environmental and social problems. Construction of the pipeline required the clearing of forests and vegetation for the pipeline right of way. Although the project's environmental management plan established mitigation measures to restore native vegetation and prevent vehicular access to the right of way, the sponsors have so far failed to carry these activities out. This is a critical violation of the environmental management plan.

If adequate measures are not taken, there is a danger that hunters, colonists, land speculators and local residents will turn the right-of-way (ROW) into a road. This would facilitate even more environmental destruction. Initial efforts to control the right-of-way with fences attached to wood posts for the entire 600-kilometer route have been ineffective. At the Bank's urging, GTB has agreed to install at least 40 fences with sturdier concrete posts. Given that fences alone will not prevent access, GTB also wants to establish army command posts in 3 different sites throughout the ROW and contract the army to patrol and prevent access to right of way. Local communities are strongly opposed to this proposal and instead want to establish a system of local control and monitoring.


During pipeline construction, there were many direct environmental and social impacts on community residents. In 1998, the Comite de Fiscalizacion de el Carmen, a local monitoring body, documented a number of serious social and environmental impacts and violations. These included: the close proximity of the pipeline route and worker camps to the town; trash dumping; purchases of illegally harvested wood for construction; new access roads; inadequate erosion control measures; failure to repair damage caused to local roads and power generator; workers misconduct and sexual abuse of local women; and reduced community access to food and medicine. Only after significant pressure were these issues addressed.


The government and Banks are promoting oil and gas development as a key element of their economic growth strategy for Bolivia. However, the potential for this development approach to further concentrate wealth, displace people from their lands and degrade the resources upon which many poor people depend, raises serious questions about its contribution to poverty reduction for the majority of Bolivians. Indigenous peoples are particularly at risk, since the lands which they have traditionally depended on for their survival, are being overrun by logging, mining and oil and gas interests, while the legal process to grant land titles is stifled by lack of political will and inefficient bureaucracy. Individually, each of these projects will cause significant social and environmental impacts. Together, their aggregate social and ecological consequences could be irreversible and disastrous.


*This information is based on the report "The Bolivia-Brazil Pipeline: A "Model" Development Project?" March 1999 by Kari Hemmerschlag, Bank Information Center, as well as her Bolivia trip report 1999



Chad-Cameroon Pipeline Project
West Africa

Project Description
The Chad-Cameroon Oil and Pipeline Project involves drilling 300 oil wells in the southern part of Chad. It also entails construction of a 650-mile pipeline from Chad through Cameroon to the Atlantic Coast. During peak production the project will produce 225,000 barrels of oil per day.


World Bank Group Involvement
The World Bank has not yet approved financing for the Chad-Cameroon project. Proposed support includes a $115 IBRD loan to the governments of Chad and Cameroon and a $250 IFC loan to a consortium led by ExxonMobil. ExxonMobil's previous partners, Shell Oil and Elf Aquitaine, dropped out of the consortium in 1999 delaying the project's approval at the World Bank. On March 31, Chevron of the United States and Petronas of Malaysia joined the operating consortium, putting the project back on track.


Environmental and Social Concerns
The Chad-Cameroon Pipeline poses numerous environmental risks. The pipeline traverses several major rivers, and an oil spill would pollute much-needed drinking water. ExxonMobil has not prepared or publicly released an adequate oil spill management plan. The project also threatens valuable ecosystems, including Cameroon's coastal rainforest. Project-related upgrading of existing seasonal roads may lead to logging and illegal poaching in otherwise inaccessible areas. Cameroon has some of the most biologically diverse and important forests in West Africa.

The Chad-Cameroon Pipeline is fraught with social risk. The risk is so great that ExxonMobil has negotiated agreements with Chad and Cameroon placing the project beyond the reach of national laws in case of disaster. The pipeline is a classic example of a large-scale development project that will benefit multinational corporations at the expense of the poor, and that will exacerbate inequities and could lead to increased human rights abuses. Communities in both countries have called for a moratorium on moving forward with the project until these risks are fully addressed.

Widespread human rights abuses plague Chad, casting doubt upon the Bank's claims that local communities support and provided input into the project. The Chadian government recently shut down a community-based organization that was working with farmers in the project area who had voiced concern about inadequate compensation. It had previously jailed a member of Parliament who openly questioned how the project's revenue would be shared. The government has still not investigated massacres of hundreds of unarmed civilians that took place between 1997 and 1998 in the country's oil-producing region. The US State Department's 1999 Human Rights Report confirmed the dire situation, stating "State security forces continue to commit extrajudicial killing, and they torture, beat, abuse and rape persons the government at times restricted freedom of speech and of the pressand interfered with the operation of human rights groups."

Cameroon's human rights situation is not much better. The US State Department confirms that the government impedes the work of NGOs, and that its security forces conduct illegal searches and harass citizens. Corruption is rampant in Cameroon. Transparency International, a non-profit corruption watchdog organization, has named Cameroon the world's "most corrupt" country two years running. Not only does Cameroon's human rights situation preclude true citizen participation in decision-making about the project, but its corruption makes it unlikely that the project's revenue will benefit those who need it most.



Basic Resources International Ltd. Oil
Guatemala, Central America

Project Description
This project involves oil development in a national park in the northern Guatemalan Peten, home to valuable tropical forests and globally important wetlands. It entails upgrading production of the Xan oil field, located in Guatemala's Laguna del Tigre National Park and the construction of a 120-kilometer pipeline with a 30,000 barrel per day capacity from the Xan oil field to a refinery in the town of La Libertad. The pipeline follows an existing road for nearly 20 kilometers, then deviates from the road and crosses previously undisturbed forests and wetlands within the park.


World Bank Involvement
IFC gave two separate loans to the project sponsor, Basic Resources International Limited. IFC approved a $20 million loan in 1994. In 1996 they approved an additional $24 million for the company, to further expand operations at the Xan oil field and to construct a 109.5-kilometer extension of the pipeline, from La Libertad to the town of Raxruja.


Environmental and Social Concerns
This oil development project presents serious environmental concerns. Guatemala's Peten region is one of the most biologically valuable in the world. The Maya Biosphere Reserve spans much of the region, forming the basis of a Guatemalan government plan to conserve its threatened environment. The reserve contains primary tropical forest, valuable wetlands, and important biodiversity. The Laguna del Tigre national park is at the heart of the Maya Biosphere Reserve, and is a 340,000 hectare area that is strictly protected and reserved for conservation. Laguna del Tigre contains the largest protected freshwater wetland in Central America, and is the winter home for migratory birds. Guatemalan law prohibits oil development in core zones of the Maya Biosphere Reserve, including the Laguna del Tigre National Park. However, the government grandfathered Basic Resources International Ltd.'s concession into the park, since it was granted five years before the park was created.

The Laguna del Tigre National Park was already facing severe pressure from colonization without the project. Although the pipeline could have been constructed entirely along an existing road, the company chose to site it through undisturbed forests and wetlands within the park. Once it leaves Laguna del Tigre it enters a "buffer zone" within the Maya Biosphere Reserve. By creating a new right-of-way through this buffer zone, the pipeline will create a new point of access to the park, jeopardizing it further.

The project's environmental assessment neither considered alternative routes for the pipeline nor addressed its indirect environmental impacts such as colonization.

The project also highlights shortcomings in the Bank's accountability. Although the pipeline supported by the first IFC loan was classified as "Category A"-a designation given to projects with severe environmental impacts-environmental organizations did not learn about the project until after IFC had approved it and construction was about to begin. This illustrates a gap between policy and practice at the World Bank. Information was also difficult to access on the second IFC loan, particularly in Guatemala.


This project also demonstrates how the national interests are sometimes subverted. In this case, the Guatemalan environmental agency asked for a delay in the financing decision of the second loan, but IFC proceeded with its decision to finance the project without full permission of the Guatemalan environmental agency.


* This information is based on the report "The Environmental Impacts of International Finance Corporation Lending and Proposals for Reform: A Case Study of Conservation and Oil Development in the Guatemalan Petan" 1999 by Ian A. Bowles, Amy B. Rosenfeld, Cyril F. Kormos, Conrad C.S. Reining, James D. Nations, and Thomas Ankersen.



Kumtor Gold Mine
Kyrgyzstan, Eastern Europe


Project Description

The Cameco/Kumtor gold mine is one of the world's largest gold deposits. The project is located in the Tien Shan mountains of Kyrgyzstan, one of the smallest and poorest states of the former Soviet Union.

World Bank Involvement
IFC provided $40 million in financial backing and MIGA $45 million in political risk insurance to Cameco, the project sponsor.


Social and Environmental Concerns
The past two years have seen three chemical spills take place at the Kumtor mine. The most egregious accident occurred in May 1998, when a company truck spilled 1.7 tons of highly toxic sodium cyanide into the Barskaun River, a source of water for drinking and irrigation. During the spill, cyanide flowed downstream into the country's largest lake, Issyk-Kul. Hospital officials in Kyrgyzstan attributed four deaths to cyanide poisoning. According to reports, the spill led to approximately 2,600 people being treated and more than 1,000 of them hospitalized. Kumtor Mining Company did not inform the Kyrgyz government, local health officials or local residents about the spill until hours after it had occurred. Cameco/Kumtor and their financiers-the World Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and US Overseas Private Investment Corporation-have yet to fully answer questions about the accident.

A second accident took place in July of 1998, spilling 70 liters of nitric acid. The third accident occurred in January 2000 when a truck overturned on a bridge, dumping nearly 1500 kilograms of ammonium nitrate between the mine and the village of Barskoon. Ammonium nitrate is a blasting chemical that can harm aquatic life. Experts from the Kyrgyz Emergency Ministry are examining the soil and water near the spill site.


In response to the third chemical spill in less than two years, environmental, human rights, and civic leaders have called for an independent, third party environmental audit of Cameco Corporation's operations in Kyrgystan. They have also called on IFC and Cameco to publicly release the emergency response plan for the mine. IFC and the company have rejected each of these requests.


Environmental organizations have challenged IFC and Cameco to justify their continued secrecy and refusal to release environmental information, and to initiate independently monitored studies and measures to prevent more accidents. The continuing lack of adequate response by the project sponsor and government officials to the community crisis and NGO concern has led to the deterioration of trust around the project. At the moment IFC has denied the need for an independent environmental audit of the mine. IFC continues to support the company despite its continued lack of transparency and information disclosure in regard to environmental and human health safety and risks, and public release of the emergency response plan.



Lihir Gold
Papua New Guinea, Southeast Asia

Project Description
Lihir Gold is an open pit gold mine on Lihir Island, a remote island nearly 700 kilometers off the coast of Papua New Guinea. The project is one of the world's largest new mining ventures, and its annual production will place the project sponsor among the world's 15 largest gold producers. The first phase of mining operations will last an expected 15 years. The project will dump nearly 400 million tons of waste rock and toxic tailings directly into the ocean, a practice that is generally banned around the world.


World Bank Involvement
The project is led by the giant RTZ and run by Lihir Gold Ltd. In 1997, MIGA issued $10 million in coverage to RTZ and $66.6 million in coverage to a syndicate of commercial lending institutions led by Union Bank of Switzerland. The project is led by RTZ and run by Lihir Gold, and includes a consortium of foreign private corporations, the government of Papua New Guinea and the landowners of Lihir Corporation.


Environmental Concerns
Stockpiling large amounts of ore over long periods, disposal of waste rock, and disposal of toxic tailings make the Lihir mine an environmental disaster waiting to happen. Sixty-four percent of all ore from the mine will not be processed immediately, but will be stockpiled for later use. The long stockpiling period will generate runoff containing iron, copper, arsenic, zinc, aluminum, manganese, cadmium, lead, and possibly mercury and chromium. This runoff, and additional wastewater from the normal mining operations, will be discharged into the ocean. The company's share offering prospectus states that "runoff from construction and operations will result in sedimentation effects to coral reefs" along the island's east coast, and will reduce "the diversity of coral species and fish."


The processing of 104 million tons of proved and probable ore reserves from the Lihir mine will create 341 million tons of waste rock. Most of this material will be disposed of in the ocean about 1.5 kilometers from the shoreline. Up to four barges will continually dump between 1,400 and 4,600 tons of rock per hour. The gold from the Lihir mine will be extracted through a process using 1785 tons of highly sodium cyanide each year. The mine will produce at least 89 million tons of toxic tailings during its life span. These tailings will be will be discharged into the sea by a pipeline at a depth of 125 meters. The US Overseas Private Investment Corporation refused to finance the mine because this offshore dumping violates international agreements such as the London Dumping Convention and the South Pacific Convention.


Social Concerns
Lihir Island has a population of about 5,500. Most inhabitants are involved in subsistence agriculture. In 1995, after six years of extensive negotiations, the mining consortium and the Lihir Landowner's Association concluded a so-called "integrated benefits package." As a condition of this package, landowners in turn had to sign a contract not to bring future claims against the mining company.

The project will create about 1200 jobs, of which one third to one half are supposed to go to local people. The arrival of workers and job seekers from other areas and the resettlement of part of the local population have caused social upheaval. The project's environmental plan cited increased male alcohol abuse and physical abuse of wives as problems occurring with the onset of mining exploration. In July 1998, angry landowners from Putput-a village near the mine-temporarily shut down the project's operations. They were concerned about gas leaking from autoclaves and about the mine's general environmental impacts.


*This information is based on the report "Tainted Gold from the Pacific" Feburary 1996 by Peter Bosshard, Berne Declaration, www.evb.ch



Omai Gold Mine
Guyana, South America


Project Description
The Omai gold mine is located in a remote area nearly one hundred miles south of Georgetown, Guyana's capital. The project is an open pit mine and is one of South America's two largest gold mines. Project sponsors hope to mine more than 260,000 ounces of gold annually over an eleven-year span.


World Bank Involvement
Omai Gold Mines Ltd., a Guyanese subsidiary of the mining company Cambior Inc., is the project sponsor. Omai manages, operates, and has 65 percent ownership of the mine. Other shareholders include the Guyanese government and Golden Star Resources, Ltd., a Canadian company. MIGA issued two reinsurance contracts totaling $49.8 million in 1992.


Environmental and Social Effects

Omai extracts gold from the mine using cyanide. After chemically removing the gold, they dilute the cyanide-laced tailings and dump them in ponds with clay-lined dams. Omai's reliance upon the cyanide's breaking down naturally, rather than actively reducing it in the tailings solution, creates a environmental and public health risk.

This risk manifested itself in a 1995 mining disaster. A tailings dam burst due to faulty construction, releasing three million cubic meters of cyanide-laced waste into the Omai River-a tributary of the Essequibo, Guyana's main river. The company did not contain the spill for four days. Guyana's president called it a "national environmental disaster," and declared 80 kilometers of the Essequibo an environmental disaster zone.


The Omai and Essequibo rivers provide drinking water for many residents, livestock and wild animals. Fish and shellfish from the rivers are important food for many. The spill killed aquatic life and led to hospitalization of three people for cyanide poisoning. The government warned residents living near the Essequibo not to use its water for cooking or drinking.


This spill was the largest of four that had already occurred in 1995, and followed on the heels of unheeded calls to the government to review its mining contract with the company. Omai closed the mine after the disaster, but its parent company Cambior won permission to reopen it in 1996. In 1997, Mecherches Internationales Quebec filed a motion to authorize a class action lawsuit on behalf of 23,000 victims of the spill.

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